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Abstract 
Anger may be more responsive than disgust to mitigating circumstances in judgments of wrongdoing.  
We tested this hypothesis in two studies where we had participants envision circumstances that could 
serve to mitigate an otherwise wrongful act.  In Study 1, participants provided moral judgments, and 
ratings of anger and disgust, to a number of transgressions involving either harm or bodily purity. They 
were then asked to imagine and report whether there might be any circumstances that would make it all 
right to perform the act. Across transgression type, and controlling for covariance between anger and 
disgust, levels of anger were found to negatively predict the envisioning of mitigating circumstances for 
wrongdoing, while disgust was unrelated.  Study 2 replicated and extended these findings to less serious 
transgressions, using a continuous measure of mitigating circumstances, and demonstrated the impact of 
anger independent of deontological commitments. These findings highlight the differential relationship 
that anger and disgust have with the ability to envision mitigating factors. 
Keywords: Anger, disgust, moral emotions, mitigating circumstances, moral judgment, deontological 
commitments 
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Moral Emotions and the Envisaging of Mitigating Circumstances for Wrongdoing 
 Within criminal law, mitigating circumstances refer to the circumstances surrounding an act of 
wrongdoing that, if proven to be factual, may serve to excuse or reduce the culpability of an ordinarily 
punishable act (Fitzgerald, 1962).  An appeal to mitigating circumstances is not to contest the fact that a 
person performed a harmful act, but speaks to whether the act is a crime and whether the actor is culpable 
and liable for punishment. The Anglo-American legal system recognizes at least two broad classes of 
mitigating circumstances (Hart, 1968; Robinson, 1984). The first class focuses on the mental state of the 
actor at the time the act was performed (e.g., whether the actor was aware of her actions, mistaken about 
her movements, or coerced into performing the act unwillingly). The second involves the intended 
outcome of the act or the reason(s) for acting (e.g., whether the act was committed in the service of some 
greater good, to prevent further harm, performed out of necessity, or for self-defense).  Although legal 
judgments and moral judgments of ordinary people do not always coincide, several studies have shown 
that many of the same defenses found acceptable within a legal context are likewise recognized by lay 
adults (e.g., Alicke, 2000; Darley & Shultz, 1990; Weiner, 1995; Woolfolk, Doris, & Darley, 2006) and 
even young children (e.g., Darley, Klossen, & Zanna, 1978).  In one important study for example Darley 
et al. (1978) had adults, along with first and fourth graders, read a story about a person harming another 
person and then indicated how wrong the act was and how severely the actor should be punished.  Some 
of the subjects, however, were provided additional background information pertaining to one of three 
different classes of legal defenses: provocation, necessity, and public duty.  The results suggested that 
participants of all ages recognized all three of these factors as valid defenses, and reduced the severity of 
their judgments accordingly.   
Most research in psychology has been interested in the kinds of conditions people conceive of as 
mitigating when reasoning about acts of harm. A large body of research has shown that adults and 
children alike reduce their condemnation of harm when it is committed unintentionally or by accident 
(Costanzo, Coie, Grumet, & Farnill, 1973; Cushman, 2008; Karniol, 1979), without foresight of the risks 
(Lagnado & Channon, 2008), under duress or coercion (Woolfolk et al., 2006), as just punishment, 
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training, instruction, or discipline (Rule & Duker, 1973; Sousa, Holbrook, & Piazza, 2009), as self-
defense or retribution for a prior offense (Darley et al., 1978; Hewitt, 1975), out of necessity or in the 
service of a greater good (Darely et al., 1978; Nichols & Mallon, 2006; Sousa et al., 2009), or harm 
intended to help rather than to injure (Rule, Nesdale, & McAra, 1974). Less is currently known about the 
mitigating circumstances that may differentially influence people’s anger or disgust as evoked by 
categories of wrongdoing not necessarily related to harm, for example, acts that violate societal norms 
about sexual or bodily purity (e.g., incest, paraphilia; see Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007; Haidt, Koller, 
& Dias, 1993; Prinz, 2007; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, in press; 
Tybur, Lieberman, & Griskevicius, 2009; Young & Saxe, 2011). 	  
Anger, Disgust, and Moral Judgment	  
Recently, researchers studying moral emotions have begun to examine the role of mitigating 
factors in the emotions people experience when perceiving an act of wrongdoing (e.g., Russell & Giner-
Sorolla, 2011a, b). This research has started to document important differences between the emotions of 
anger and disgust—two distinct emotions that have both been implicated in judgments of wrongdoing 
(e.g., see Haidt et al., 1993; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Rozin et al., 1999). 
Anger has long been understood as an emotional response to perceived wrongdoing, particularly 
intentional and unjustified harm, or acts of injustice, including violations of a person’s rights (Averill, 
1982; Batson, Chao, & Givens, 2009; Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999; Quigley & Tedeschi, 1996; 
Rozin et al., 1999). Although there is some disagreement about the exact relationship between anger and 
judgments of wrongdoing or blame (i.e., whether anger precedes, co-occurs with, or follows from these 
judgments; see e.g., Averill, 1982; Quigley & Tedeschi, 1996; Weiner, 1995), the relationship is 
nonetheless robust, such that changes in moral judgment tend to reflect corresponding changes in anger, 
and vice versa (see pilot study discussed below). For example, anger provoked in one situation has been 
shown to “spill over” into orthogonal decisions about blame and punishment, but dissipate when relevant 
cues of justice are highlighted (see Goldberg et al., 1999).  At least three antecedent features of a harmful 
event seem to impact upon the intensity of anger:  severity (Rule & Duker, 1973; Schwartz, Kane, Joseph, 
Running head: MORAL EMOTIONS AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES  5 
 
& Tedeschi, 1978), intentionality (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011a), and justifiability (Hewitt, 1975; 
Quigley & Tedeschi, 1996). Additionally, whether or not the act of harm was perceived to be avoidable or 
controllable may be a fourth antecedent, though findings for this dimension are less consistent (cf. 
Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004; Betancourt & Blair, 1992; Shaver, 1985; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). 
Thus, it would seem that a number of contextual factors have the potential to elicit and modulate the 
intensity of anger.  
By contrast, the elicitation of disgust seems to be governed by a more restricted range of 
antecedents (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011a, b).  Disgust is thought to be an object-focused emotion that 
responds to the presence of contagions, or pathogen-transmitting elements, such as feces, phlegm, blood, 
or rotting flesh (Oaten, Stevenson, & Case, 2009; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Park, Faulkner, & 
Schaller, 2003). In the social domain, however, disgust may also respond categorically to a particular 
class of violations—those pertaining to bodily-purity norms, or the rules governing the proper uses of the 
body within a given culture (see Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada, 1997; Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & 
Cohen, 2009; Rozin et al., 1999; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011a, in press).  Consistent with this thesis, 
Russell and Giner-Sorolla (2011a) found that, in direct contrast to anger, levels of reported disgust were 
unaffected by whether or not an act of wrongdoing was performed intentionally, and affected only by 
whether the act violated a bodily norm.  
The fact that disgust responds to a more restricted range of antecedents than anger suggests that it 
should be more impervious to cognitive manipulations, including the envisioning of mitigating 
circumstances that might transform a moral judgment. In support of this view, Russell and Giner-Sorolla 
(2011b) had participants list anything that could change their opinion about an act of harm or a 
comparative purity violation.  Participants filled in measures of their anger, disgust, and moral judgment 
before and after the listing task.  The authors found that, although participants could just as easily list 
things for purity violations as for harm, the mental exercise of listing various counterfactuals did little to 
change their feelings of disgust, while their feelings of anger shifted more dramatically as a result of the 
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exercise. Additionally, any change in overall moral judgment was related to the change in anger not 
disgust.   
In the present research, we extended this cognitive simplicity hypothesis for disgust more 
specifically to the envisaging of circumstances that might mitigate the perceived wrongness of a harmful 
or impure act.  We predicted that anger would be negatively related to the imagining of mitigating 
circumstances for wrongdoing more so than disgust, due to anger’s stronger association with the 
appraisals underlying moral judgments.  This hypothesis follows from the research reviewed above, but is 
also supported more directly by some pilot data obtained by our research team.  We presented 90 adults 
with either a harm transgression (a neighbor had kicked their pet dog) or an equivalent purity 
transgression (a neighbor had cooked and ate their pet dog after it died of natural causes).  Participants 
reported their anger, disgust, and moral judgment regarding each act. Then the experimenter provided 
them with additional circumstances surrounding the act (e.g., that the dog was attacking a child [as a 
defense for harm], or the actor was stranded in the wilderness without food [as a defense for purity]). 
Participants rated their emotions and the wrongness of the act a second time, after having considered 
these extenuating circumstances, and we calculated difference scores of their judgments and emotions.  It 
was found that changes in anger more closely mirrored changes in wrongness than did changes in disgust, 
when covariance between anger and disgust was controlled for.1 This was true regardless of transgression 
type (i.e., harm or purity violation). Furthermore, reductions in anger were consistently larger for anger 
than for disgust—that is, disgust was more resistant than anger to change. These findings are consistent 
with the view that anger is more closely tied than is disgust to the conditions influencing people’s 
judgments of wrongdoing.    
The Current Research 
 In the present research we provide further empirical support for the argument that anger is more 
intimately tied to judgments of wrongdoing, and the factors impinging on judgments of wrongdoing, than 
is disgust.  Specifically, individuals who report high levels of anger should struggle to envision 
circumstances that could overturn their initial moral judgment compared to individuals who report low 
Running head: MORAL EMOTIONS AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES  7 
 
levels of anger. In contrast, if feelings of disgust operate largely independent of mitigating factors, but 
instead reflect the categorical presence (vs. absence) of contagious or “impure” elements, then levels of 
disgust should not be related to the envisioning of mitigating circumstances to the same degree as anger.  
We tested these predictions in two studies, in which we had participants respond to transgressions 
involving harm or violations of bodily-purity norms. For each transgression, participants offered their 
moral judgment of the act, and provided ratings of anger and disgust, via both emotion terms and facial 
displays.  Individuals then considered whether there might be circumstances that would make it “OK” 
(i.e., morally permissible) for the person to perform the act, and they justified their response either by 
describing the circumstances (Study 1) or by describing the circumstances and then classifying them 
(Study 2).  In Study 2, we widened the scope of our examination by manipulating the perceived severity 
of the transgression, in addition to the transgression type. We also assessed two subject variables that 
were likely to influence the willingness of our participants to consider mitigating circumstances for 
wrongdoing: trait disgust and deontological-vs.-consequentialist moral commitments.   
Study 1 
Participants, Design and Procedures 
  We used a 3 (scenario: Dog, Age, Corpse) x 2 (transgression type: Harm vs. Purity) mixed-
measures design. One hundred and fifty-three American participants (55 female; Mage = 31.63 years, SD = 
11.04) participated via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com) in exchange for payment. They 
were presented three different transgression scenarios, in a random order. Participants were randomly 
assigned to either the purity (n = 77) or harm versions (n = 76) of the scenarios.  The harm transgressions 
described acts of harm or disrespect: hitting a pet dog (Dog), a 16-year-old stealing from a 70-year-old 
(Age), and kicking the body of a deceased spouse (Corpse). The purity transgressions described violations 
of bodily or sexual purity:  eating a pet dog (Dog), a 16-year-old romantically involved with a 70-year-old 
(Age), and having sex with the body of a deceased spouse (Corpse).  The harm and purity versions of 
each scenario were identical in wording, with the exception of the verb (e.g., “hit” vs. “ate” in the Dog 
scenario). For each transgression, participants were asked to imagine that they discovered one of their 
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neighbors had committed the transgression. They provided their moral judgment of the act, ratings of 
anger and disgust (including emotion words and facial expressions), responded to a Yes-No mitigating 
circumstances probe, and finally to a writing task, where they justified their Yes-No responses.  After 
they had completed these procedures for all three scenarios, participants were debriefed and compensated. 
Measures  
For their moral judgment, participants rated how wrong it was for their neighbor to commit the 
act (1 = Not at all wrong; 7 = Very wrong). As measures of emotion, they rated the extent to which the 
event made them experience anger (angry, mad, outraged, furious), and disgust (sickened, grossed out, 
queasy, repulsed), rated on a scale 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much).2 Participants were also presented two 
photographs of an actor, one depicting a prototypical angry face and another depicting a prototypical 
disgust face, taken from the University of California, David, Set of Emotion Expressions (Tracy, Robins, 
& Schriber, 2009). Participants rated on a 1-7 scale how much they felt the emotion conveyed by the 
facial expression. For the mitigating circumstances probe, participants were asked, “Can you think of 
circumstances in which it would be OK for someone to [e.g., eat their pet dog]?”, and responded either 
“Yes” or “No”. Participants were then asked to justify their response: “Please describe the circumstances 
that would make it OK for someone to [e.g., eat their pet dog], or write ‘None’ if there are no 
circumstances that would make it OK.” 	  
Results 
Preliminary analysis. A 3 (scenario) x 2 (transgression type) mixed-measures ANOVA of 
wrongness scores revealed equivalent levels of wrongness across transgression type, F < 1, p = .74: the 
harm violations (M = 5.92, SD = 0.86) and purity violations (M = 5.97, SD = 0.97) were rated equally 
wrong. The interaction of scenario and transgression was non-significant, F < 1, p = .83, however, there 
was a main effect of scenario, F(1, 151) = 16.68, p  < .001, such that  the Corpse scenario was rated 
significantly more wrong (M = 6.23, SD = 1.20) than the Dog scenario (M = 5.72, SD = 1.48), t(153) = 
4.09, p < .001, and the Age scenario (M = 5.84, SD = 1.46), t(153) = 2.92, p < .01, while the Dog and Age 
scenarios were rated equally wrong, t < 1, p = .45. Thus, on average, participants perceived all three acts 
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as highly wrong, and there were no systematic differences in wrongness ratings between transgression 
types, though there were minor differences in wrongness ratings across the three scenarios. 
The anger words and the anger face had a strong internal reliability across the different scenarios 
and transgression types (Cronbach’s α = .91-.95); likewise, for the disgust words and the disgust face (α = 
.84-.93). Since they were answered on the same scale, words and faces were aggregated together to form 
separate indices of anger and disgust.  A 3 (scenario) x 2 (emotion) x 2 (transgression type) mixed-
measures MANOVAs on indices of disgust and anger revealed the expected interaction of emotion and 
transgression type, F(1, 151) = 140.55, p < .001, η2p = .48; indicating more anger than disgust for harm, 
and more disgust than anger for purity.3 Thus, ratings of disgust and anger were aggregated across the 
three scenarios. On average, participants reported more disgust (M = 5.56, SD = 1.34) than anger (M = 
4.56, SD = 1.34) in response to the purity transgressions, and more anger (M = 5.10, SD = 1.29) than 
disgust (M = 3.92, SD = 1.28) in response the harm transgressions (all paired-samples ts > 8.36, ps < 
.001).  
Moral emotions and moral judgment. Feelings of anger and disgust highly correlated across the 
three scenarios, both for harm, r(76) = .55, p < .001, and purity violations, r(77) = .66, p < .001. To test 
for the unique contribution of anger and disgust on moral judgments, we conducted a regression analysis 
on aggregated wrongness scores, with indices of anger and disgust as simultaneous predictors. This was 
done separately for harm and purity transgressions. Levels of anger were highly predictive of wrongness 
ratings for both harm, β = .65, t(73) = 5.99, p < .001, and purity transgressions, β = .52, t(74) = 4.80, p < 
.001, controlling for levels of disgust. Levels of disgust were moderately predictive of wrongness ratings 
for purity transgressions, β = .26, t(74) = 2.46, p = .02, but unrelated to wrongness ratings for harm, β = -
.04, t < 1, ns, controlling for anger. Thus, levels of anger co-varied with wrongness ratings more so than 
levels of disgust, across transgression type. 
 Envisaging of mitigating circumstances. The scenarios differed significantly in terms of the 
distribution of participants endorsing mitigating circumstances: Dog (44.5%), Age (23.0%), and Corpse 
(14.5%), according to a related-samples Cochran’s Q test, p < .001. Cross-tabulation 2 x 2 Chi-square 
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tests of the Yes-No responses, with transgression type (harm vs. purity) as the other independent variable, 
revealed no effect of transgression type on endorsement for the Dog (harm: 49%; purity: 40%) and Age 
scenarios (harm: 20%; purity: 26%), χ2s < 1.10, ps > .28.  However, a significantly greater percentage of 
participants endorsed a mitigating circumstance for the harm version of the Corpse scenario (21%), 
compared to the purity version (8%), χ2(1) =  5.46, p < .02, ϕ = .19.  Importantly, there was no difference 
in the overall rate of endorsement of mitigating circumstances as a function of transgression type. On 
average, participants endorsed mitigating circumstances for roughly one out of three of the scenarios for 
both the harm transgressions (M = 0.30, SD = 0.25) and purity transgressions (M = 0.25, SD = 0.26), 
independent-samples t(151) = 1.21, p = .23. Thus, it was not the case that it was simply conceptually 
harder to envision mitigating circumstances for purity transgressions than for harm transgressions.  
The mitigating circumstances participants reported were coded first by the first author and second 
by an independent rater blind to the purposes of the study, who was instructed on the application of the 
coding scheme. Six responses were omitted because the meaning was unclear (e.g., “at the childish age”) 
or they reported that the act would be permissible under any circumstances.  Interrater agreement was 
strong across the six scenarios (Cohen’s κ = .90-1.00). Although a few participants provided multiple 
rationales (max = 2), most responses were comprised of a single rationale. This was true across 
transgression type: on average, participants generated an equivalent number of rationales for harm 
transgressions (M = 0.70, SD = 0.52) and purity transgressions (M = 0.66, SD = 0.60), t < 1, p = .68.  
Although rationales varied between scenario (see Table 1), some common themes emerged across 
transgression type. For example, in both the Dog purity scenario and Age harm scenario, participants 
were willing to excuse the wrongdoing if it occurred in a survival or emergency situation. Self-defense 
and revenge were rationales found only in the harm scenarios, while performing the act in a different 
culture and consent were themes found only among the purity scenarios. Thus, although mitigating 
categories varied between the scenarios, some common rationales emerged as well.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Running head: MORAL EMOTIONS AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES  11 
 
 
Relationship between emotions and envisaging of mitigating circumstances. To test the 
overall strength of anger vs. disgust on endorsement of mitigating circumstances within the harm and 
purity transgressions, we aggregated Yes-No responses to the three scenarios to form a continuous 
measure, ranging from 0-1, reflecting the proportion of Yes responses (1 = “Yes” to all three scenarios; 0 
= “No” to all three scenarios), and ran a linear regression, using anger and disgust indices as simultaneous 
predictors. Across the three scenarios, anger negatively predicted endorsement of mitigating 
circumstances for both harm transgressions, β= -.35, t(74) = 2.39, p < .02,	  and	  purity transgressions, β= -
.32, t(73) = 2.61, p < .02, controlling for shared variance with disgust. In contrast, disgust was statistically 
unrelated to endorsements for both harm, β= -.20, t(74) = 1.63, p > .10, and purity transgressions, β= .00, 
t = 0, ns, controlling for shared variance with anger. Thus, anger negatively predicted the envisaging of 
mitigating circumstances, independent of disgust, while levels of disgust were unrelated to the envisaging 
of mitigating circumstances, when covariance with anger was controlled for.  
Discussion 
 The findings of Study 1 provide initial support for our hypothesis that anger is more closely tied 
to the conditions that mitigate judgments of wrongdoing than is disgust.  Although feelings of anger and 
disgust highly correlated across the harm and purity vignettes, the independent contribution of anger to 
judgments of wrongdoing was significant, while the independent contribution of disgust was not. 
Furthermore, anger negatively predicted the envisaging of mitigating circumstances independent of 
disgust, whereas disgust was largely unassociated with mitigating circumstances.  Interestingly, these 
results cannot be explained in terms of participants finding it easier to envision factors that could reduce 
their judgments of harm, as opposed to purity transgressions. As anticipated, our harm vignettes evoked 
greater anger than disgust, and our purity vignettes evoked more disgust than anger; nevertheless, with the 
exception of the Corpse scenario, participants envisioned mitigating circumstances for purity 
transgressions just as often as for harm.  Thus, differences observed here between anger and disgust are 
unlikely to be attributed to underlying conceptual differences between harm and purity violations with 
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regards to the plausibility of mitigating conditions.  Likewise, the present findings cannot be explained by 
differences in perceived intentionality, as the harm and purity transgressions were all presented as 
intentional acts4, and intentionality (as a response category) rarely appeared in participants’ mitigating 
circumstances (see Table 1).  
Study 2 
These initial findings are encouraging, yet Study 1 had several limitations that we sought to 
overcome in Study 2. First, although the purity vignettes produced more aggregate disgust than anger, it is 
possible that participants perceived some harm in the purity vignettes, and thus the boundary between 
harm and purity was not as clear as it could be.  For example, we did not specify in the Dog purity 
vignette how the dog died before it was consumed.  Thus, some participants may have inferred that the 
neighbor killed the dog before eating it. Given the somewhat fuzzy boundaries between harm and purity 
in Study 1, we sought in Study 2 to more carefully control for inferences of harm within the purity 
vignettes. Second, the acts described in the vignettes were all perceived to be highly immoral. It remains 
to be seen whether our findings might replicate with less serious transgressions. Thus, in Study 2 we 
manipulated the severity of the transgression, in addition to the type of transgression. Third, the 
instructions we used to assess mitigating circumstances in Study 1 were worded such that most 
participants provided only one circumstance or none at all. In Study 2, we amended the instructions to 
foster more continuous responses. Specifically, participants were instructed to list as many distinct 
circumstances as they could think of, and we constructed a 13-item classification scheme that they used to 
classify their responses.   
Finally, in Study 1 we did not explore any subject variables that might differentiate participants 
who are willing to consider mitigating circumstances from those who are unwilling, or who are 
particularly sensitive to emotions of moral condemnation. For instance, it may be that disgust better 
predicts the envisaging of mitigating circumstances at the trait level (i.e., disgust sensitivity). Trait 
disgust, for instance, has been shown to increase the level of condemnation individuals have towards 
various purity violations, including attitudes towards homosexual acts (Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 
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2009) and drug use (Kurzban, Dukes, & Weeden, 2010).  Thus, we included a measure of trait disgust in 
Study 2 to explore this possibility.  
Differences in moral cognitive styles might also be relevant to the envisaging of mitigating 
circumstances. Research on moral cognitive styles suggests that individuals differ in how strictly they 
endorse and apply moral rules (e.g., see Lombrozo, 2009; Piazza, 2012). “Deontologists” tend to endorse 
moral rules without exception, while “consequentialists” believe that moral rules can be overturned or 
violated under the right circumstances. In particular, consequentialists seem to care more about whether 
an act brings about a good or beneficial outcome than whether an act violates a moral norm. By contrast, 
a deontologist might reason for example that torturing someone is wrong regardless of the good that 
might be obtained (e.g., preventing a terrorist attack).  How strictly a person endorses moral norms might 
affect the amount of condemning emotion a person experiences with regards to harm or purity violations, 
which in turn may influence a person’s willingness to envisage mitigating circumstances. On the other 
hand, deontological commitments might operate independent of emotions to affect mitigating 
circumstances. We explored these possibilities in Study 2. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 204 adults (U.S. residents only) recruited through the same web 
service as in Study 1, in exchange for payment. A prescreening procedure omitted those who participated 
in Study 1. Twelve subjects were dropped because they did not view the action described in the vignette 
as wrongdoing (i.e., they said the act was “1 = Not at all wrong”), and thus it was senseless to have them 
consider mitigating circumstances for the act. This left a total of 192 participants (112 male, 80 female) 
with a mean age of 28.93 years (SD = 10.79). The ethnicity of the sample was 82% White/Caucasian, 
10% Asian, 4% Hispanic/Latino, and 4% other or mixed ethnicities.	  
Pre-test. To obtain harm and purity vignettes that varied reliably in their severity, we pre-tested a 
number of harm and purity transgressions.  We had 47 UK students from the University of Kent provide 
ratings of wrongness, anger and disgust for each scenario.  The wrongness measure was the same as in 
Study 1, and the emotion measures involved single items—the anger and disgust facial displays from 
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Study 1 with corresponding labels “angry” and “disgusted”. Based on the results, we selected two 
transgressions—one harm, one purity—that produced equally low wrongness scores, p = .45, and two 
transgressions—one harm, one purity—that produced equally high wrongness scores, p = .80. We also 
made sure that, independent of level of wrongness, the two harm transgressions evoked significantly more 
anger than disgust, while the two purity transgressions evoked significantly more disgust than anger (see 
Table 2 for the description of the vignettes, along with descriptive statistics).	  
Design, measures and procedures. We used a 2 (transgression severity: major vs. minor) x 2 
(transgression type: harm vs. purity) between-subjects design.  Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of four vignettes: minor purity violation (n = 43), minor harm violation (n = 51), major purity 
violation (n = 48), and major harm violation (n = 50). After reading the vignette, participants responded 
to the same moral judgment measure and anger and disgust assessments as in Study 1 (anger: α = .90-.95; 
disgust: α = .71-.95). These measures were followed by the mitigating circumstances instructions: “Can 
you think of any circumstances, not mentioned in the scenario, that would make it OK for [e.g., the 
brother and sister to do what they did?].” Participants were instructed that if they could not think of any 
circumstances that would make it permissible to perform the act, they were to write “none”.  After 
writing, they were asked to enumerate the number of distinct circumstances they wrote down, ranging 
from 0 (minimum) to 10 (maximum). They were instructed that if they previously wrote “none” that they 
should select “0” (one of the experimenters later verified that these instructions were followed and that 
the number selected matched the number of distinct circumstances participants wrote down, with 
discrepancies corrected). Participants who provided at least one distinct circumstance were provided a list 
of 13 categories to classify their response(s), including an “other” category for participants to volunteer 
their own category if they felt that none of the categories applied.  The instructions read:  
“For each distinct circumstance you wrote down, select the category that most adequately 
classifies it. Please do not select more than one category for each circumstance that you wrote 
down (e.g., if you wrote down two distinct circumstances, select no more than two categories). 
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Please do not select a category that you did not write about, and read all the options before 
making your selection.”  
The 13-item classification scheme was developed by the authors to capture a wide range of 
mitigating circumstances people could possibly envisage (see Table 3 for a list of the 13 categories).  The 
categories were either derived from categories obtained from Study 1 (e.g., “romantic love”, “survival”, 
“different culture”), reflected categories within criminal law (e.g., “provocation”, “necessity”, “insanity”, 
“self-defense”, “duress”; see Darley et al., 1978; Hart, 1968; Robinson, 1984), or pertained to categories 
addressed in past research (e.g., “utility”, “consent”; see Sousa et al., 2009; “awareness”; see Lagnado & 
Channon, 2008; “privacy”; see Haidt et al., 1993).  
 Next, participants completed the Three-Domain Disgust Scale (Tybur et al., 2009), as our 
measure of trait disgust. This instrument assesses tendencies towards experiencing disgust in three 
distinct domains, and therefore produces three distinct sub-scales: moral disgust (α = .94), sexual disgust 
(α = .87), and pathogen disgust (α = .84). Deontological (vs. consequentialist) commitment was assessed 
with an instrument adapted from Lombrozo (2009), but expanded by the authors from its original six 
items to include a total of 13 items that apply to a more diverse range of moral transgressions beyond 
those necessarily involving harm. Participants responded to 13 questions of the following form: 
“Which of the following statements best characterizes your position on lying? (1) It is never 
morally permissible to lie. (2) If lying produces more good than bad, then it is morally 
permissible to lie. (3) If lying produces more good than bad, then it is morally obligatory to lie.” 
 The other twelve questions concerned killing, torture, assisted suicide, stealing, incest, 
cannibalism, betrayal, deception, malevolent gossip, breaking promises, breaking the law, and treason. 
Scores ranged from 1 (Deontological response) to 3 (Strong Consequentialist response). Responses were 
reverse scored, so that increasing scores represented a stronger deontological commitment. The internal 
reliability of the instrument was good (α = .78). Finally, participants answered demographic questions and 
were debriefed and compensated. 
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Results 
Manipulation checks. A 2 (severity: minor vs. major) x 2 (transgression type: harm vs. purity) 
MANOVA on wrongness, anger, and disgust scores, confirmed the pilot study results. The major 
transgressions were viewed as more wrong (M = 5.71, SD = 1.61) than the minor transgressions (M = 
4.70, SD = 1.69), F(1, 188) = 20.19, p < .001, η2p = .10. Despite the pretest, harm transgressions were 
viewed as more wrong (M = 5.59, SD = 1.40) than the purity transgressions (M = 4.80, SD = 1.95), F(1, 
188) = 12.68, p < .001, η2p = .06. More importantly, the purity transgressions produced significantly more 
disgust (M = 4.78, SD = 1.63) than did the harm transgressions (M = 2.81, SD = 1.29), F(1, 188) = 87.70, 
p < .001, η2p = .32, whereas the harm transgressions elicited more anger (M = 3.71, SD = 1.62) than did 
the purity transgressions (M = 2.49, SD = 1.67), F(1, 188) = 27.24, p < .001, η2p = .13. Furthermore, the 
harm transgressions produced more anger than disgust, t(100) = 6.77, p < .001, while the purity 
transgressions produced more disgust than anger, t(90) = 14.72, p < .001. There were no interactions 
effects on any of these dependent measures, Fs < 2.03, ps > .15. 
Preliminary analysis. On average, participants reported 0.72 (SD = 0.96) distinct mitigating 
circumstances, with scores ranging from 0 to 6 circumstances (53% of participants reported zero 
circumstances; 30% reported one circumstance; 13% reported two circumstances; 4% reported three or 
more circumstances). We conducted a preliminary 2 (severity) x 2 (transgression type) ANOVA on the 
number of mitigating circumstances participants reported, to test for potential differences due to the type 
of transgression, or severity of the transgression. There was no effect of severity of transgression on the 
number of mitigating circumstances participants envisaged (Mmajor = .71, SD = 1.03; Mminor = .72, SD = 
.89), F < 1, ns. Furthermore, the difference by transgression type was not quite significant (Mharm = .56, 
SD = 0.76; Mpurity = .89, SD = 1.12), F(1, 188) = 20.32, p  = .14, η2p = .95, and there was no interaction of 
severity and transgression type, F < 1, ns. Thus, as in Study 1, participants just as easily produced 
mitigating circumstances for purity as for harm. Additionally, the mildness of the transgression had no 
effect on the number of circumstances participants generated.  
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Zero-order correlations revealed that the trait disgust subscales were unrelated to mitigating 
circumstances, for both purity, rs < .14, ps > .16, and harm, rs < .15, ps > .17. Thus, trait disgust was 
dropped from further analysis. By contrast, state disgust, anger, and deontological commitment all 
correlated significantly with mitigating circumstances, for both harm and purity, rs > .23, ps < .03. As in 
Study 1, measures of state disgust and anger strongly correlated for both harm, r(101) = .61, p < .001, and 
purity violations, r(91) = .60, p < .001. Disgust correlated marginally with deontological commitments, 
but only for purity transgressions, r(91) = .18, p = .09 (harm, r = .13, p = .19), while anger did not 
correlate with deontological commitments for either transgression type, rs < .15, ps > .12.  Finally, 
although both anger and disgust correlated with moral judgment ratings, when covariance between anger 
and disgust was controlled for in a regression, anger independently predicted judgments of harm, β = .51, 
t(98) = 4.83, p < .001, and purity, β = .19, t(88) = 1.99, p < .05, whereas disgust only independently 
predicted judgments of purity, β = .56, t(88) = 5.82, p < .001, but not harm, β = .09, t < 1, p = .92. 
Categories of mitigating circumstances. Table 3 depicts the categories of mitigating 
circumstances participants listed for harm and purity transgressions. As can be seen, there was great 
variety in the kinds of mitigating circumstances participants envisioned for harm and purity 
transgressions, most likely due to the specific properties of the vignettes used.  For example, consent and 
romantic love were more commonly used with regards to purity than harm, perhaps because these 
vignettes dealt with sexual acts—a domain of action in which consent and romantic love are particularly 
relevant. By contrast, self-defense, retribution, and survival were listed more frequently for harm than for 
purity. Self-defense and retribution, in particular, seem uniquely relevant to harm contexts.    
Main analysis of emotions and mitigating circumstances. To investigate the independent 
contributions of anger and disgust on the envisaging of mitigating circumstances, we entered ratings of 
anger and disgust into a regression analysis as simultaneous predictors of mitigating circumstances, along 
with the deontological commitment variable (given its marginal relationship with disgust).  Since there 
were no significant differences in mitigating circumstances reported due to severity or transgression type, 
we collapsed both variables in the analysis to improve our statistical power.  Replicating the findings of 
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Study 1, ratings of anger significantly predicted the number of mitigating circumstances participants 
reported, in a negative direction, β = -.30, t(188) = -4.20, p < .001, after controlling for covariance with 
disgust. Also as in Study 1, after controlling for covariance with anger, disgust failed to serve as an 
independent predictor of mitigating circumstances, β = -.04, t < 1, ns.  Deontological commitment, 
however, remained a significant predictor of mitigating circumstances, β = -.19, t(188) = -2.75, p < .01, 
independent of anger and disgust.  
General Discussion 
Across two studies and a variety of actions, when controlling for shared variance of anger and 
disgust, we found that strong feelings of anger interfered with the envisaging of circumstances that could 
transform the morality of the act, regardless of the type of transgression (harm or purity) or its severity.  
On the other hand, feelings of disgust were largely unrelated to the envisaging of mitigating 
circumstances, assessed as a state variable or trait variable. Furthermore, in Study 2, we showed that the 
influence of anger on the mitigation of wrongdoing operated independent of deontological commitments, 
that is, the tendency for an individual to condemn rule violations regardless of an act’s consequences.  
It is important to note that the circumstances participants were instructed to envision in our 
studies should not be construed as counterfactual alternatives—participants were not asked to think of 
alternative actions the actor could have performed, or what the actor could have done differently to avoid 
having performed the act at all (e.g., see Roese, 1997). Rather, participants were instructed to list 
circumstances that could change the moral status of the act in question while maintaining the fact of the 
act itself.  Therefore, this research does not speak directly to how disgust and anger relate to the ability to 
generate and respond to counterfactuals, but only to anger and disgust differentially influencing the 
production of mitigating circumstances (cf. Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011b). Our methods also did not 
draw a strong distinction between partial and full mitigation, that is, between “mitigating circumstances” 
and “excuses”. Although this subtle distinction is important within a legal context, it was beyond the 
purview of the present studies, which recruited lay people and not legal experts. Furthermore, while we 
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focused here on judgments of wrongdoing, future research should extend this line of investigation to 
attributions of blame as well, since wrongdoing does not necessarily entail culpability.   
Why would anger be more associated with an inability to envision mitigating circumstances than 
disgust? One possibility is that feelings of anger placed participants in a punitive mindset, closing them 
off to information that could potentially exculpate the wrongdoer. While this is certainly possible (see 
e.g., Goldberg et al., 1999), this type of motivated prosecutor explanation is inconsistent with our pilot 
study, where we found that participants who were angered by an immoral act were generally open to 
mitigating circumstances provided by the experimenter and felt less angry as a result. Furthermore, recent 
findings suggest that feelings of disgust can likewise promote a condemning mental state (Schnall, Haidt, 
Clore, & Jordan, 2008; Wheately & Haidt, 2005), thus, anger may not be unique in this respect.  More 
likely is that anger has a stronger connection, than disgust has, to the appraisals underlying moral 
judgment (e.g., whether act is perceived to be intentional, controllable, or justified; see Russell & Giner-
Sorolla, 2011a). Thus, participants who reported strong feelings of anger in response to the harmful and 
impure acts were most likely attending to the reasons why the act in question was wrong or unjust, rather 
than how the act might be mitigated or excused. By contrast, feelings of disgust do not involve complex 
appraisals related to judgments of wrongdoing. Rather, disgust is elicited by the mere presence of 
contagious or taboo elements (e.g., dead bodies, sexual deviance) embedded within an action-event itself 
(Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011a, in press). These incidental feelings of disgust then become associated 
with a judgment that is motivated primarily by other elements (e.g., that the actor knowingly violated a 
cultural taboo). Yet when the appraisals supporting a judgment of wrongdoing are addressed via the 
elucidation of mitigating factors (e.g., the actor was forced to violate the taboo under duress or the victim 
gave their consent), the disgusting elements of the act remain, as do the disgust feelings they evoke. This 
is why, we contend, many of our participants who experienced high levels of disgust were still able to 
mentally transform an immoral act into a permissible one—their feelings of disgust were not directly tied 
to the appraisals guiding their moral judgment.   
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It is noteworthy that we obtained the effect of anger across two different categories of 
perpetrators.  In Study 1, we asked participants to imagine that a neighbor committed the act, while in 
Study 2 the perpetrator was an unknown third party.  Previous research has found that individuals are 
more likely to feel anger when someone close to them has done wrong rather than a stranger (Fischer & 
Roseman, 2007; Kuppens, van Mechelen, & Meulders, 2004). The instruction in Study 1 to imagine that a 
neighbor committed the act differs from prior research on the morally condemning emotions, which does 
not specify the closeness of the person who committed the act (e.g., Rozin et al., 1999; Russell & Giner-
Sorolla, 2011 a, b). In future research it may be interesting to see if even greater intimacy with the 
transgressor (e.g., a romantic partner or family member) might influence the envisioning of mitigating 
circumstances to an even greater extent. Likewise, research by Batson et al. (2009) suggests that people 
experience more anger when they themselves or someone they care about are the victim of undeserved 
harm, as opposed to a stranger or out-group member.  We might predict that individuals would find it 
particularly difficult to imagine mitigating circumstances when they themselves, or someone they care 
about, is the victim of wrongdoing.  
One interesting corollary of our research was that participants were just as capable of coming up 
with plausible mitigating circumstances for purity violations, as they were for harm. This is somewhat 
surprising given past perspectives that have emphasized categorical differences between acts of harm and 
violations of purity (e.g., Haidt et al., 1993; Young & Saxe, 2011). For example, studies by Young and 
Saxe (2011) found that judgments of purity violations (e.g., incest) were less susceptible to manipulations 
of intentionality than judgments of harm (e.g., an act of incest was still wrong even if the actors did not 
know it was incest). Though very important, intentionality is only one factor among a number of factors 
that influence judgments of wrongdoing and blame (Monroe, Guglielmo, & Malle, 2012; Quigley & 
Tedeschi, 1996). The present findings suggest that factors related to consent, cultural norms, romantic 
love, coercion, and even the symbolic meaning of the act (e.g., whether the actors were performing 
theatrically) were all recognized by a number of participants as influential in their judgments of purity 
violations.  Although some mitigating factors were unique to purity violations, a number of categories 
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overlapped with harm as well (e.g., performing a harmful or impure act out of necessity).  Given the array 
of factors participants reported for purity, we assert that there is much to gain from a more systematic 
investigation of the conditions people find morally relevant to this domain.  
Conclusion 
Our current findings highlight the differential roles of anger and disgust in moral judgment and 
people’s ability to change their judgments.  Many studies have connected disgust to moral judgment (e.g., 
Inbar et al., 2009; Rozin et al., 1999; Schnall et al., 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). Still, the relationship 
between disgust and moral judgment is far from clear (see Haidt, 2001; Huebner, Dwyer, & Hauser, 2008; 
Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Pizarro, Inbar, & Helion, 2011; Prinz, 2007; Russell et al., 2012). As we have 
seen in the present research, anger seems to be more tightly connected to moral judgment, and the factors 
affecting moral judgment, than is disgust. Furthermore, this seems to be the case for judgments of both 
harm and purity (the latter being the postulated “moral” domain of disgust). Thus, although disgust is 
under some circumstances linked to wrongdoing, it seems as if people can more easily separate their 
feelings of disgust from perceptions of wrongdoing than they can for anger.  This is important to bear in 
mind when we consider interventions for redressing wrongdoing. Our findings suggest that people who 
are angry will find it difficult to come up with potential defenses for why a perpetrator may have acted.  
This is not to say that anger makes people unwilling to consider a valid defense when it is posed, only that 
an angry mind is unlikely to go looking for one.  
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Footnotes 
1 Note that the covariance of disgust and anger is a recurrent problem in research of this kind aimed at 
discriminating the unique effects of disgust and anger.  One potential source of covariance involves the 
metaphorical use of disgust language by lay people to express anger for transgressions theoretically 
irrelevant to disgust (e.g., lying, cheating, unfairness, breaking promises; see Nabi, 2002; Russell, Piazza, 
& Giner-Sorolla, 2012). Because of this issue, in the present studies we utilized regression analyses to 
control for shared variance between anger and disgust. 
2 Note that the term “disgust” was avoided as research suggests its meaning and usage in everyday 
language corresponds more closely to the theoretical meaning of anger than of disgust (Nabi, 2002). 
3 A number of other effects were observed that were of little theoretical interest. If interested in these 
results, please contact the authors. 
4 In the absence of contravening information, the default assumption is that an action is performed 
intentionally (see Rosset, 2008). 
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Table 1  
Circumstances in which it would be OK to commit the transgression, by scenario and transgression type 
Dog Age Corpse 
Harm Purity Harm Purity Harm Purity 
Hit Pet Dog Eat Pet Dog 16-yr-old steals from 
70-yr-old 
16-yr-old romantically 
involved with 70-yr-old 
Kick Dead Spouse Sex with Dead Spouse 
Dog was attacking 
someone or self-
defense (19); 
Training or 
punishing the dog 
with mild harm (18); 
If the harm was 
unintentional (1) 
Emergency situation 
where the actor was 
starving to death (33); 
Lived in a different 
culture where it’s OK 
to eat dogs (5); Dog 
died of natural causes 
(1) 
Emergency situation 
where the actor 
really needed the 
money for food or 
medicine (12); As 
revenge (1) 
If consensual, parent’s 
gave consent, or age of 
consent was sixteen 
(10); They are in love 
(6); Lived in a culture 
where it was legal (3); If 
the 16-yr-old was 
psychologically mature 
(3); If they were the last 
two people on earth (1) 
Spouse was 
physically abusive 
when he/she was 
alive (12); Other 
reason (e.g., was an 
accident, corpse was 
on fire or needed to 
be moved) (8)  
Unaware that the 
spouse is dead or died 
during sexual 
intercourse (4); They 
were in the grips of 
despair (3); Spouse 
consented before dying 
(2) 
Note. Count in parentheses.  
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Table 2  
Transgressions used in Study 2 with pre-test means and standard deviations  
 Wrongness Anger Disgust 
Minor Transgressions    
Phil, who is 18 years old, and his 67-year-old neighbor kiss 
each other passionately and rub against each other until 
they climax. (Purity) 
5.23  
(2.44) 
3.79  
(2.50) 
6.11  
(2.38) 
Emily put false information on her resume, which makes it 
more impressive, and as a result gets hired by a company. 
(Harm) 
5.51  
(1.94) 
4.21  
(2.16) 
3.40 
(2.05) 
Major Transgressions    
A brother and sister kiss each other passionately on the 
mouth. (Purity) 
7.68  
(1.95) 
5.34 
(2.83) 
7.47 
(2.00) 
At his local bar, Frank walks over to a person who made 
disparaging comments about his favorite football team, and 
punches him off his bar stool. (Harm) 
7.62  
(1.33) 
6.43  
(2.17) 
5.72 
(2.24) 
Note. Within-row comparisons of anger and disgust (based on repeated-measures t-tests) are all significant at p < .01. N = 47. 
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Table 3  
Frequency of mitigating circumstances reported from each category by transgression type (Study 2)  
 Transgression Type 
Category Harm Purity 
The action was performed unintentionally, accidentally, or without awareness. 4 10 
The action was performed out of self-defense or to protect another person from harm. 13 3 
The action was performed for survival or because it was an emergency. 14 5 
The action was performed with the consent of all persons involved. 1 26 
The recipient of the action deserved it, or the action was performed as an act of just punishment or 
retribution for previous wrongdoing. 
10 0 
The action was performed with the intention to teach or help train the recipient of the action. 0 0 
The actor was forced to perform the act under duress, coercion, or threat of life or serious injury. 3 5 
The action was performed in the pursuit of a greater good (e.g., to save lives or prevent future harm). 5 3 
The action was performed in private. 0 6 
The action was performed in a cultural context where it’s socially acceptable to perform the act. 4 14 
The action was performed out of romantic love. 2 14 
The action was performed by an individual who was insane or not with sound mind. 2 1 
None of the above categories adequately classify my response. Please provide your own suitable 2 6 
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category (e.g., “mild harm”; “they were performing a play”; “they were acting”). 
Total 60 93 
 
 
